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Wright
William J. Brennan, Jr.t
J. Skelly Wright, my close and dear friend of over 30 years, was a
remarkable man. The brilliant achievements he crowded one upon an-
other in almost 40 years on the federal bench richly earned him his na-
tional reputation as one of the outstanding jurists of the nation's history.
His lasting impact in shaping the development of the law of civil rights
and liberties has vastly enriched us all.
It is of course true that some of his most notable decisions were greeted
with harsh and bitter invective. The charge was that he was an "activist
judge," exceeding his proper role. This, of course, is not an unfamiliar
charge. But since our beginnings, lively, even acrimonious, debate about
the proper role of judges in a democratic society has been with us. The
judge who believes that the judicial power should be made creative and
vigorously effective is labeled "activist." The judge inclined to question
the propriety of judicial intervention to redress even the most egregious
failures of democracy is labeled "neutralist" or "passivist." The labels are
not synonymous with "conservative" or "liberal;" where yesterday "ac-
tivist" was pinned on liberals, today it's on conservatives. As often as not,
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however, such labels are used merely to express disapproval of a particu-
lar judge's decisions. If useful at all, the labels may be more serviceable to
distinguish the judge who sees his role as guided by the principle that
"justice or righteousness is the source, the substance, and the ultimate end
of the law," from the judge for whom the guiding principle is that "courts
do not sit to administer justice, but to administer the law." Such legendary
names as Justice Holmes and Judge Learned Hand have been associated
with the latter view. Holmes' imaginary society of Jobbists is limited to
judges who hold a tight rein on humanitarian impulse and compassionate
action, stoically doing their best to discover and apply already existing
rules. But judges acting on the former view, and Skelly Wright was one,
believe that the judicial process demands a good deal more of them than
that. Because constitutions, statutes and precedents rarely speak unam-
biguously, a just choice between competing alternatives has to be made to
decide concrete cases. Skelly Wright would argue that in such cases "the
judge's role necessarily is a creative one-he must legislate; there is no
help for it; when the critical moment comes and he must say yea or nay,
he is on his own; he has nothing to rely on but his own intellect, experi-
ence and conscience." 1
Skelly Wright emphatically affirmed that he was not a Jobbist in the
area of equal rights for the disadvantaged. In his Biddle Lecture at
Harvard Law School, he assured us "in the area of equal rights for disad-
vantaged minorities I remain an uncompromising activist."2 For he stead-
fastly adhered to the principle that law "constitutes . . . a recognition of
human beings, as the most distinctive and important feature of the uni-
verse which confronts our senses, and of the function of law as the historic
means of guaranteeing that preeminence."'
Skelly Wright urged unceasingly that the equality principle "is the rock
upon which our constitution rests," and that "the noblist mission of the
judiciary" is to foster the development of that principle.4 He warned
against any view that was insensitive to the legitimate claims of the pow-
erless and would not give full and proper effect to their constitutional
right to equal treatment. "Much of what I have sought to do on the
bench," he said, "has been aimed at combating this risk."' Not, he went
on, that there had not been some glory days for the equality principle. He
rejoiced that modem constitutional jurisprudence was abandoning the
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Framers' narrow use of the word "men" to exclude blacks, women and
the poor. Skelly Wright's plea was that the equality principle be even
further expanded. "In the future," he said, "I pray that we will see the
equality principle take on even further meaning, that it will evolve to en-
courage still broader participation in governmental affairs and social
life."6 His vision was of rulers and the ruled united by a sense of their
common humanity. In this vision, the essence of the relationship between
state and citizen is the relationship between one human being and an-
other, each entitled to his fair share of society's riches. By opening a win-
dow to his own struggles in exercising authority, Skelly Wright gave us a
richer sense of why the law and judges had the responsibility to bring this
about. As he demonstrated, judges cannot console themselves with the be-
lief that reliance on formal rules alone, without compassion, can ever be
sufficient to be faithful to the vision.
Skelly Wright was a quiet, modest man, more embarrassed than happy
with praise. He was a man of principle, and a wholly compassionate com-
plete human being who never lost sight of the human dimensions of the
great problems that confront society. We are a better America because
Skelly Wright lived. We will miss his person, his inspiration, and the gay
spirit that endeared him to us all.
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